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THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS : A CONTINUED
DISSECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
FAITH-BASED PRISON UNITS
Lynn S. Branham †
To protect his privacy, I ll call him Bob. Bob had reached what, for
him, was a low point in his life. Diagnosed with a brain tumor and suffering
from epilepsy, he was struggling to cope with the physical debilitation and
the uncertainty that attend serious medical problems. To compound his
troubles, he was facing daunting financial bills, and he had been denied a
promised job promotion for which he had long worked.
Then Bob attended the Walk to Emmaus, a three-day spiritual retreat.
Although Bob had been attending worship services at his church each week
for years and led a small group from his church that met every other week,
the Walk to Emmaus was a spiritual experience for him like none other.
With its nonstop, God-centered focus, he was able to step back from his life s
travails, see those travails from a new perspective, and gain the strength to
endure and surmount the challenges he currently was confronting.
Then there is Bethany. Bethany recognized that her spiritual life had
reached a plateau, but the ways commonly employed by others to reignite
that spiritual spark for which she yearned such as weekly communal
worship, praying, or reading the Bible, Torah, Koran, or other religious
works had just not worked for her. So she did something that was
unconventional but, for her, spiritually needed. She stayed at a convent
where she could focus her attention exclusively on God. And though not a
Catholic herself, she found there the spiritual renewal and peace that she had
not been able to find elsewhere.

† Visiting Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law and University of Iowa
College of Law; B.A., University of Illinois; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. I would like to
extend my thanks to my colleague John Dunsford for reviewing an earlier draft of this Article.
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Both Bob and Bethany opted to experience what I have called an
immersion approach to spirituality.1 They and others who have chosen to
live for varying lengths of time in a communal environment in which a
spiritual focus predominates have found that they need immersion-like
experiences to charge or recharge their depleted or defunct spiritual batteries.
Bob and Bethany also have said that they benefited not just spiritually, but
physically, mentally, emotionally, and relationally, from what for them was a
profound religious experience.
But what about prisoners, who lack the freedom to leave prison and go to
a place where they can obtain, along with others, the concentrated and
sustained spiritual nourishment that they believe they need to grow
spiritually or in other ways? Can governmental officials afford prisoners
these kinds of immersion-like experiences without abridging the First
Amendment s Establishment Clause? 2 And, if they can, are governmentally
funded faith-based prison units, which exemplify this immersion approach
and are sometimes referred to as God pods, 3 still inherently
unconstitutional?
In an article that I wrote several years ago, I contended that faith-based
prison units subsidized by the government could be operated in conformance
with the Establishment Clause. 4 Although, since then, a federal district court
has declared a faith-based unit in an Iowa prison to be unconstitutional, 5 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has upheld that decision, 6 and other
challenges to faith-based units have been mounted across the country, 7 I
adhere to that conclusion.
1. Lynn S. Branham, “Go and Sin No More”: The Constitutionality of Governmentally Funded
Faith-Based Prison Units, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291, 316 (2004).
2. The First Amendment directs that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This constitutional restriction also applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment s Due Process Clause. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985); see U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
3. E.g., Wilson v. Moore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1340 41 (N.D. Fla. 2003).
4. Branham, supra note 1, at 306 43.
5. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d
862, 934 (S.D. Iowa 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007).
6. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509 F.3d 406,
425 26 (8th Cir. 2007). In this case, the Eighth Circuit, with Justice Sandra Day O Connor sitting by
designation, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the lower court. While the court
of appeals held that the way in which the faith-based unit at issue in that case had been operated and
funded violated the Establishment Clause, the court emphasized that the district court s injunction did not
foreclose the state from contracting with providers of religious services and programs for prisoners,
including organizations that operate faith-based units. Id. at 428.
7. The Freedom From Religion Foundation ( FFRF ), for example, has filed lawsuits challenging
faith-based units in the federal prisons and in a women s prison run by the Corrections Corporation of
America ( CCA ) under a contract with the state of New Mexico. See Freedom From Religion
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In Part I of this Article, I explore the potential significance of several
Supreme Court cases decided since I first wrote on this topic. In Part II, I
discuss why conventional tests applied to Establishment Clause claims and
the test generally applied to prisoners constitutional claims seem inapposite
when examining the constitutionality of faith-based prison units. Then, in
Parts III and IV, I delve more fully into two key arguments, ones that I
believe are red herrings, which have been asserted by those who clamor
against the constitutionality of faith-based prison units: that prisoners
participation in faith-based units inevitably is coerced and that these units
invariably manifest a lack of governmental neutrality on religious matters in
contravention of the Establishment Clause. I conclude, as I have before, that
if structured properly, faith-based units can pass constitutional muster.
I.

RECENT SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS

Several recent Supreme Court cases potentially have some bearing on the
question of the constitutionality of faith-based prison units. Two cases that
arose in the prison context Cutter v. Wilkinson 8 and Johnson v.
California 9 are particularly germane. After demonstrating how the Supreme
Court remains deeply split about the Establishment Clause s meaning and
import, I discuss the Supreme Court s rulings and analyses in those two
cases.
A. A Court Divided
If the adage that a house divided cannot stand were applied to the
Supreme Court s ruminations on the Establishment Clause, the Court would
be in a state of collapse. Fifteen years ago, a well-known First Amendment
expert, now a federal appellate judge, succinctly described the Supreme
Court s Establishment Clause jurisprudence: It is a mess. 10 It remains so.
Like a Creole chef continually tinkering with his recipe for jambalaya
and periodically returning to his original recipe, the Supreme Court continues
Foundation, Recent Court Cases, http://ffrf.org/legal/legal2.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). FFRF
abandoned the latter lawsuit in 2007 after the federal district judge to whom the case was assigned
indicated that he probably was going to dismiss the case on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing
to contest the faith-based program at the CCA facility. See Clare Hughes, Lawsuit Targeting Faith-Based
Prison Program Becomes “Hein Fatality,” ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION & SOC. WELFARE POL Y, July 10,
2007, http://www.religion andsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=6740.
8. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
9. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
10. Michael W. McConnell, Exchange, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
120 (1992).
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to vacillate as to how to assess whether an Establishment Clause violation
has occurred. One Establishment Clause test the Supreme Court has applied
is known as the Lemon test. The Court first articulated this test in 1971 in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, in which it held that the dissemination of certain state
funds to parochial schools abridged the Establishment Clause.11 To pass
muster under the three-pronged Lemon test as it was originally formulated, a
statute or governmental program must have a secular purpose, have a
principal or primary effect other than advancing or curtailing religion, and
avoid excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 12
The Court sporadically applies the Lemon test in Establishment Clause
cases, inciting Justice Scalia to charge that the Court selectively applies or
disregards the test depending on the outcome it wishes to reach in a case:
When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we
wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. 13 In 2005, a
majority of the Supreme Court appeared to apply this test in McCreary
County v. ACLU of Kentucky, concluding that the posting of the Ten
Commandments in two county courthouses failed the test s first prong and
consequently violated the Establishment Clause. 14 But while stating that she
joined the majority opinion, Justice O Connor seemed to apply a different
test in her concurring opinion, one that the Court had applied in the past. 15
This test, known as the endorsement test, essentially asks whether a
reasonable observer would perceive that the government is endorsing
religion or a religious practice. 16
A hodgepodge of other Establishment Clause tests were enunciated in
McCreary County and Van Orden v. Perry, a case decided the same day as
11. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971).
12. Id. at 612 13.
13. Lamb s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). In Lamb’s Chapel, Justice Scalia likened the Lemon test
to a ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried. Id. at 398.
14. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 870 71 (2005). In his dissenting opinion in
McCreary County, Justice Scalia charged that the Court had skewed the Lemon test in a way that made it
even more objectionable. Id. at 900 03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He pointed out, for example, that while
the Lemon test requires that governmental actions have a secular purpose, the Court now was demanding
that the secular purpose be predominant. Id. at 901 02.
15. Id. at 881 85 (O Connor, J., concurring) (discussing governmental endorsement of religion or a
religious practice). The Court previously had applied the endorsement test in, for example, County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 93 (1989).
16. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002). Courts are to ascribe to this hypothetical
reasonable observer an understanding of the history and context of the governmental action or
program being challenged under the Establishment Clause. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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McCreary County in which the Supreme Court this time upheld the
constitutionality of a display of the Ten Commandments on public
property. 17 Perhaps most notably, the majority in McCreary County
acknowledged that there are special instances when the Establishment
Clause condones governmental actions whose evident purpose is
presumably religious. 18 In Van Orden, Justice Thomas advocated that
coercion should be the touchstone for Establishment Clause analyses,19
while Justice Scalia, in McCreary County, insisted that the Establishment
Clause only prohibits the government from favoring one religious sect over
another in certain circumstances, and not religion over irreligion.20 And
Justice Breyer essentially threw up his hands, stating in Van Orden, I see no
test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment. 21
One need go no further into this jurisprudential thicket to understand that
Establishment Clause law is in flux. And to add to the uncertainty about how
the Supreme Court will interpret this constitutional provision in the future,
the composition of the Court has changed since McCreary County and Van
Orden were decided. 22 This has led one preeminent scholar to predict that
we are about to witness a radical change in the law of the Establishment
Clause. 23
B. Two Pertinent Prison-Related Cases
1. Cutter v. Wilkinson
The Supreme Court decided another Establishment Clause case in 2005,
one of import to the question of the constitutionality of faith-based prison
units. The issue before the Court in that case, Cutter v. Wilkinson, was
whether Congress had transgressed the boundaries of the Establishment

17. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005).
18. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 859 n.10.
19. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring).
20. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 885 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While Justice Scalia agreed that
the government cannot show favoritism towards any religious sect when dispensing funds or other
assistance to religion, he opined that public references by the government to a Creator could be
monotheistic without violating the Establishment Clause. Id. at 893 94.
21. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
22. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have now joined the Court, replacing former Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O Connor.
23. Erwin Chemerinsky, Essay, Why Separate Church and State?, 85 OR. L. REV. 351, 352 (2006).
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Clause by enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
( RLUIPA ). 24
The section of RLUIPA at issue in Cutter provides enhanced protections
to prisoners religious liberty, greater than those afforded by the Constitution.
According to the Supreme Court, the First Amendment s Free Exercise
Clause, which generally prohibits governmental incursions on religious
freedom, 25 permits prison officials to take actions that inhibit prisoners
exercise of their religion as long as the actions are reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest[]. 26 But RLUIPA goes much further than
this constitutional minimum in accommodating prisoners exercise of their
religion, prohibiting governments from imposing any substantial burden on
prisoners or other institutionalized persons exercise of their religion unless
the burden is justified by a compelling governmental interest that is being
furthered through the least restrictive means. 27
The Supreme Court unanimously held in Cutter that RLUIPA was
constitutional on its face. 28 The Court cited the fact that RLUIPA relieves
what the Court considered exceptional government-created burdens on
private religious exercise as the [f]oremost factor underlying its
conclusion. 29 The Court also emphasized that RLUIPA does not accord
preferential treatment to any sect. 30 Finally, the Court underscored that
RLUIPA neither permits nor requires courts to ignore the burdens that a
requested accommodation would place on others. 31
While the Supreme Court said in Cutter that the burdens on others
ensuing from a religious accommodation provided to a prisoner must factor
into a court s assessment of whether RLUIPA, as applied, contravenes the
Establishment Clause, the Court took care to distinguish between the
imposition of burdens on others and the extension of benefits to them.
Significantly, the Court said that just because the government has afforded
some prisoners a religious accommodation does not mean that parallel

24. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 13 (2005) (citing Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000)).
25. The First Amendment provides in part that Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Because this constitutional provision implicitly is part of
the due process afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, it operates as a constraint on the states as well.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
26. O Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
28. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714, 725.
29. Id. at 720.
30. Id. at 720, 723 24.
31. Id. at 720, 722 23.
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secular benefits have to be extended to other prisoners. 32 The Court
recognized that, otherwise, most religious accommodations would flout the
Establishment Clause. 33 To illustrate its point, the Court noted that prison
officials permit inmates to engage in congregate worship, but not to meet
together for political rallies. 34 In addition, the government pays for prison
chaplains but not for other individuals, like political consultants, who could
help inmates develop and express their nonreligious First Amendmentrelated interests and views. 35
The Supreme Court also rebuffed the argument that RLUIPA
unconstitutionally promotes religion by encouraging prisoners to get
religion in order to enjoy the benefits of a religious accommodation. 36
The Court observed that it was dubious that inmates necessarily would
perceive a religious accommodation as a benefit. 37 In citing, as an
example, the very bland kosher diet that one prison system provided certain
prisoners at each meal day after day, 38 the Court acknowledged the sacrifices
and drawbacks that can attend the receipt of a religious accommodation.
In an important caveat, the Court added that even if certain religious
accommodations are indeed benefits, prisoners often receive such
accommodations in any event, separate and apart from RLUIPA s dictates. 39
The Free Exercise Clause, for example, mandates certain religious
accommodations. Thus, RLUIPA itself does not inexorably promote religion
in a way that violates the Establishment Clause. And as Cutter makes clear,
there is nothing untoward or inherently unconstitutional in the government
taking steps to meet prisoners religious needs even if those steps would be
forbidden by the Establishment Clause if taken in the outside world. The
Supreme Court indicated, for example, that a state can constitutionally
provide prisoners with a chaplain to help meet their spiritual needs.40 Yet it
would be a palpable violation of the Establishment Clause if the government
were to employ chaplains to provide religious services to the everyday
populace.

32. Id. at 724 25. Specifically, the Court affirmed that [r]eligious accommodations . . . need not
come packaged with benefits to secular entities. Id. at 724 (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 724 25.
35. Id. at 724.
36. Id. at 721 n.10.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 724.
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Johnson v. California

The reasonable relationship test alluded to earlier, under which a
restriction on a prisoner s exercise of religion must be reasonably related to
a legitimate penological interest to comport with the First Amendment s
Free Exercise Clause, is known as the Turner test. 41 The Supreme Court
has applied this test to an array of other constitutional claims of prisoners,
including those invoking the constitutional rights to have access to the
courts, 42 to marry, 43 and to associate with others, 44 the First Amendment
right to freedom of speech, 45 and the due process right not to be forced to
take antipsychotic medication. 46 In fact, the Court once said that the Turner
test, a test under which it is exceedingly difficult for prisoners to prevail on a
constitutional claim, is to be applied to all circumstances in which the needs
of prison administration implicate constitutional rights. 47
In Johnson v. California, 48 another case decided in 2005, the Supreme
Court confronted the implications of this all-encompassing statement and,
some might argue, blinked. In that case, the California Department of
Corrections ( CDC ) had instituted a policy, though unwritten, of
segregating prisoners by race for up to sixty days while they were being
processed into a new prison. 49 The CDC had adopted this policy in an effort
to quell the violence between racial gangs that had plagued the prison
system. 50 While prison officials were obtaining information about new
prisoners and determining which prisoners were threats to whom, prisoners
would not be housed with other prisoners who posed what the prison officials
believed to be an undue risk of harm to them.
The Supreme Court did not decide whether this temporary segregation of
prisoners based on their race violated their constitutional right to be afforded
the equal protection of the law. Instead, the Court addressed what test should
be applied, on remand, by the district court. Asserting that the Turner test
was inapposite, the Court held that the traditional test applied to racial

41. The Supreme Court first articulated this test in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
42. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 47, 361 62 (1996).
43. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97 99.
44. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 35 (2003).
45. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2575 78 (2006); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228 31
(2001); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 403 04 (1989); Turner, 482 U.S. at 91 93.
46. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 27 (1990).
47. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
48. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
49. See id. at 502.
50. Id.
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classifications should apply in the prison context as well. 51 Under this strict
scrutiny test, a racial classification both must further a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that objective.52
In an effort to explain why the Turner test did not apply to the equal
protection claim before it, the Supreme Court stated: [W]e have applied
Turner s reasonable-relationship test only to rights that are inconsistent with
proper incarceration. 53 But that statement is a classic non sequitur. In the
past, the Supreme Court has examined whether the recognition of an asserted
constitutional right in the prison context would conflict with legitimate
penological objectives, and to what extent, as part of its analysis of whether
the right exists. For example, the Turner test itself requires that there be a
valid, rational connection between a restriction on a constitutional right
and the legitimate governmental interest that purportedly justifies the
restriction. 54 The test then requires a court to incorporate three other factors
into its constitutional analysis, including the impact that accommodation of
the right will have on other inmates, correctional staff, and prison
resources. 55
The essential point is that a right s relationship to the legitimate
governmental interests that undergird proper incarceration has had a
significant bearing on whether a court will find that the right survives
incarceration. As the Supreme Court said in Pell v. Procunier, [A] prison
inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system. 56 But the asserted right s relationship to legitimate
governmental interests, or what the Court referred to in Johnson as proper
incarceration, 57 has not governed what test is to be applied to a prisoner s
constitutional claim. In other words, the demands of proper incarceration
have affected the rights prisoners have, not the selection of the test employed
in assessing the scope of those rights.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court was incorrect in holding that a
strict scrutiny test should apply to the segregation policy being challenged on
equal protection grounds. But it does mean that the Court s rationale for

51. Id. at 509.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 510 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)).
54. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 90 91. The two other factors weighed under the Turner test are, first, the extent to which
prisoners have alternative ways of exercising the right in question and, second, whether alternative means
exist to further the legitimate penological interest to which the challenged restriction is linked. Id.
56. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
57. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510.
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deeming the Turner test inapplicable in Johnson was, in my opinion,
unfounded. 58
The reason why Johnson has warranted mentioning in this Article is that
it confirms that, despite the Court s earlier pronouncement to the contrary,
the Turner test does not apply to all circumstances in which the needs of
prison administration implicate constitutional rights. 59 Although the
Supreme Court has not yet announced, in my opinion, a principled basis for
determining when the Turner test will apply and when it will not, it is
evident from Johnson that the Court will not always apply this watered-down
constitutional test to prisoners claims. The question, then, is whether a
traditional Establishment Clause test, the Turner test, or some other test
applies when assessing the constitutionality of faith-based prison units, a
question to which this Article now turns.
II. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FAITH-BASED PRISON
UNITS: THE INAPPLICABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL TESTS
A. Traditional Establishment Clause Tests
In determining whether faith-based prison units can be constitutional
and, if so, whether a particular unit is being operated in conformance with the
Establishment Clause, the threshold question is which test to apply when
making that assessment. It is evident, in my opinion, that the Lemon test is
inapposite in this context, even if it somehow endures in the future. In Cutter
v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court notably failed to apply the Lemon test when
considering whether RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause. 60 This
decision made inimitable sense because the Lemon test, which proscribes

58. In his dissenting opinion in Johnson, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, castigated the
inconsistency-with-proper-prison-administration test for another reason. Id. at 541 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that allowing the demands of proper incarceration to determine
whether the Turner test applies to a prisoner s constitutional claim will require a court to decide what
proper incarceration is, a task for which it is ill-equipped and one that is at odds with the traditional
deference courts accord correctional officials assessments of penological needs. Id. at 541 42.
59. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990). The Supreme Court also has not applied the
Turner test to prisoners Eighth Amendment claims and those invoking the right to procedural due
process. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (holding that a prisoner, who alleged that
he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when prison officials failed to protect him from being
attacked by another inmate, must prove that the officials acted with deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm, with no reference to the Turner test); Harper, 494 U.S. at 225, 228 35
(applying the Turner test to a prisoner s substantive, but not his procedural, due process claim).
60. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726 n.1 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the
Court correctly had refrained from applying the discredited Lemon test).

BRANHAM-THEDEVILISINTHEDETAILS.DOC

Spring 2008]

THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

8/7/2008 8:32 AM

419

governmental actions whose principal effect is to advance religion, 61 would
bar prison officials from taking the sundry steps they commonly take to
accommodate prisoners religious preferences and needs, including the hiring
of prison chaplains and the provision of meals to prisoners that accord with
their religious precepts.
It is likewise questionable that the Supreme Court would apply the
endorsement test when analyzing the constitutionality of faith-based prison
units, although I believe that these units can be operated in a way that meets
this test if it were deemed applicable. 62 With the new composition of the
Court, the circumstances under which, if at all, this test will be applied, even
outside the prison setting, are less than clear. But in any event, Cutter did
not even allude to this test, likely because the Court recognized that when the
government incarcerates a person, it imposes exceptional governmentcreated burdens on private religious exercise. 63 In other words, the Court in
Cutter in effect may have been acknowledging that governmental actions
taken to meet prisoners religious needs and preferences represent one of
those special instances when the construct for interpreting the
Establishment Clause departs from the norm. 64
B. The Turner Test
The question, then, is what the appropriately tailored Establishment
Clause test is that reflects the reality that the government can, and sometimes
must, take steps to eradicate or limit the heavy burdens it has placed on
prisoners exercise of their religion steps that it could not take
constitutionally in the free world. The test that courts typically, though not
always, apply to prisoners constitutional claims is the Turner test, which
often allows for the evisceration of what, in the outside world, would be a
constitutional right. 65

61. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 13 (1971).
62. As mentioned earlier in this Article, the pertinent query under the endorsement test is whether a
reasonable observer would construe the government s actions as an endorsement of religion or a
religious practice. Courts attribute to the reasonable observer an understanding of the history and
context of the governmental actions being challenged. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Since
a reasonable observer would be aware of the obstacles incarcerated individuals face in practicing their
religion, the observer would not, in my opinion, interpret the government s efforts to mitigate the adverse
effects of its own decisions to deprive people of their liberty as placing the government s imprimatur on
religion.
63. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
64. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 n.10 (2005); supra text
accompanying note 18.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 41 47.
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As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court observed in Johnson that the
Turner test applies only to rights that are inconsistent with proper
incarceration. 66 While this statement, as noted previously, seems to
confuse the constitutional test to be applied in a case with the outcome of that
test s application, it suggests that when determining whether the Turner test
applies to prisoners Establishment Clause claims, the Supreme Court would
examine or attempt to examine whether the right to not be subjected to an
establishment of religion conflicts with proper incarceration.
The Supreme Court indicated in Johnson that a right is inconsistent with
proper incarceration, triggering application of the Turner test, if the right
need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison
administration. 67 So the question is whether the constitutional right
protected by the Establishment Clause must, in the words of the Court,
necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison administration. 68
If, by proper prison administration, the Court is referring to institutional
security needs, the answer to this question is no. In my opinion, there is no
inherent discord between, on the one hand, protecting the safety of prisoners,
staff, and the public and the general security of a correctional institution and,
on the other hand, refraining from promoting religion in a way that, outside
the confines of a prison, would constitute governmental establishment of a
religion. To the contrary, one can envision how a failure to enforce the
Establishment Clause in a prison could imperil institutional security. Simply
imagine the havoc that would ensue if prison officials were to mandate that
all prisoners must participate in Christian worship services, Muslim services,
or the services of some other religious sect.
There is another reason, though, why proper prison administration
necessitates the contraction of the Establishment Clause s scope in the prison
setting. After stating in Johnson that a right s incompatibility with proper
incarceration is the criterion for divining the Turner test s applicability, the
Supreme Court recited a quotation from an earlier case: [A] prison inmate
retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status
as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system. 69
One certainly could argue that the undiluted application of the
Establishment Clause in the prison context is inconsistent with an inmate s
66. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126,
131 (2003)).
67. Id. at 510. An example of such a right is the right to freedom of association.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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status as a prisoner, making the Turner test the litmus test for prisoners
Establishment Clause claims. 70 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged,
the government appropriately can, and sometimes must, take steps to
alleviate the exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
exercise suffered by prisoners. 71 But if the Establishment Clause, at least as
the Supreme Court often has construed it, were applied with full force in
prisons, prisoners constitutional right and ability to exercise their religion
would or could be vapid indeed, as the Supreme Court seemed to recognize
in Cutter. 72 Prison officials, for example, certainly would not be able to
expend government funds to build chapels in which prisoners congregate for
worship, and government officials would be barred from taking many other
steps commonly undertaken in prisons, steps that admittedly advance
religion. 73
Even though an argument can be crafted, based on the properincarceration standard enunciated in Johnson, that the Turner test should
govern prisoners Establishment Clause claims, the Turner test is, at most,
the starting point for a court s constitutional analysis.74 I say at most

70. The fact that courts apply the Turner test to prisoners religious claims under the Free Exercise
Clause provides additional support, at least at first glance, for applying the same test to their
Establishment Clause claims. As I have noted before, Since the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause share a commonality of purpose to protect religious liberty assigning preeminent
value to the Establishment Clause seems discordant, not in keeping with the overarching goal of what one
would assume should be complimentary, not conflicting, constitutional provisions. Branham, supra note
1, at 305. I previously have concluded though, and reaffirm in this Article, that the Turner test could be,
at most, the starting point for a court s constitutional analysis. See id. at 322 (noting that compulsory
assignments of prisoners to faith-based units clearly would violate the Establishment Clause even if
they pass muster under the Turner test); infra text following note 78 (underscoring that if the Turner test
is applied when assessing the constitutionality of faith-based units, it will not and cannot be the end-all of
the Court s analysis ).
71. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). The government must take those steps when
mandated to do so by the Free Exercise Clause. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (noting that
prison officials must afford prisoners reasonable opportunities to practice their religion). But the
Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that correctional officials can take actions to accommodate
prisoners religious interests and practices even when they are not constitutionally entitled to such an
accommodation. As the Court observed in Cutter, there is room for play in the joints between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, allowing correctional officials to take steps beyond those
required by the Free Exercise Clause to facilitate inmates exercise of their religion without encroaching
on other inmates right not to be subjected to a governmental establishment of religion. Cutter, 544 U.S.
at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713 14.
73. For the results of a survey on the different kinds of faith-based programs available in each
state s prisons and the facilities utilized to offer those programs, see Survey Summary: Faith-Based
Programming, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Aug. 2003, at 8, 10 15 tbls.1 & 2.
74. Branham, supra note 1, at 306, 321 22. In my previous article on faith-based prison units, I
concluded that faith-based units, if properly planned, could meet the Turner test if it were the governing
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because, for several reasons, it is entirely possible that the Supreme Court
will not apply the Turner test as even the threshold part of its analysis of the
constitutionality of faith-based prison units. First, as noted earlier, the
Court s explication of when it will and will not apply the Turner test, in my
opinion, confuses two questions: when should the Turner test apply and what
should be the result when the test is applied in a particular case?75
Consequently, it now is much more difficult to predict with confidence when
the Supreme Court will apply the Turner test.
Second, as discussed earlier in this Article, the Supreme Court s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence currently is, to put it charitably, in
disarray. 76 It therefore is difficult to gauge which Establishment Clause test
the Court will apply in any given case.
Finally, in Cutter, the Supreme Court did not even allude to, much less
apply, the Turner test when assessing whether RLUIPA violates the
Establishment Clause. Instead, the Court simply highlighted three factors
underlying its conclusion that RLUIPA is constitutional on its face: one, that
it relieves exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
exercise ; two, that courts applying RLUIPA must consider the burdens that
a religious accommodation has on other prisoners who are not recipients of
the accommodation; and three, that the benefits accorded prisoners by
RLUIPA extend to prisoners of all faiths. 77 Since RLUIPA extends
protections to prisoners and has an impact on prison operations, it is possible
that the Supreme Court would replicate the somewhat diffuse Establishment
Clause analysis seen in Cutter in a case challenging the constitutionality of
faith-based prison units on Establishment Clause grounds. But if the Court
were to do so, my conclusion that faith-based units can comport with the
Establishment Clause would not vary. 78
Regardless of what role, if any, the Turner test would play in the
Supreme Court s analysis of the constitutionality of faith-based prison units,
it will not and cannot be the end-all of the Court s analysis. Otherwise, even
involuntary transfers to such units would be constitutional as long as
compelled participation in the activities of the units had the requisite
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, such as

test. In other words, the units are reasonably related to multiple legitimate penological interests. Id.
at 322.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 53 57.
76. See supra Part I.A.
77. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 24.
78. See infra Part IV.B.2 for a discussion of the burdens accompanying the operation of these
units, and infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the requirement that the government manifest neutrality
between religious sects when establishing faith-based units.
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recidivism reduction. But such coerced participation in worship and other
religious practices is a paradigmatic violation of the Establishment Clause, as
even those who most narrowly interpret the Establishment Clause s scope
would concede.
Because prisoners unforced participation in faith-based units is an
elementary prerequisite to their constitutionality, this Article will now flesh
out further the import of this constitutional requirement. The specific
question addressed below is whether inmates participation in faith-based
prison units is inevitably coerced, as some opponents of these units contend.
III. COERCION IN THE PRISON SETTING: AN AMPLIFICATION
Requiring prisoners, against their free will, to pray to Allah five times a
day, take communion, or read the Torah would patently violate the
Establishment Clause, as most everyone would agree. Some critics of faithbased prison units have suggested that the units, particularly those whose
operations are subsidized by government funds, similarly coerce prisoners to
participate in religious activities. I profoundly disagree.
At the heart of these critics arguments is skepticism that prisoners can
exercise true private choice 79 in the inherently coercive environment of a
prison. 80 But this sentiment flies in the face of both the law and logic.
A. The Law
The Establishment Clause is not the only constitutional provision that
places limits on governmental coercion of individuals. The Due Process
Clauses, for example, prohibit governmental officials from extracting
involuntary confessions from suspected criminals. 81 Yet the Supreme Court
has long held, and other courts have concurred, that confinement does not
abnegate the voluntariness of a confession. 82 In other words, a person can be
79. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) ( [We] have never found a program of
true private choice to offend the Establishment Clause. ).
80. See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp.
2d 862, 922 (S.D. Iowa 2006) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that
prisons are inherently coercive environments ); Katerina Semyonova, Note, In the Big House with the
Good Book: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prisons, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 209,
232 (2005) (concluding that no true choice can be made by prisoners in this context ).
81. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (construing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
82. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558 (1897) ( [I]t has been settled that the mere fact that
the confession is made to a police officer, while the accused was under arrest in or out of prison, or was
drawn out by his questions, does not necessarily render the confession involuntary . . . . ); United States v.
Larry, 126 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding a statement to the police made after police promised
to release the defendant from jail to be voluntary); Dallio v. Spitzer, 170 F. Supp. 2d 327, 339 40
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incarcerated and yet make a confession considered a product of his or her
free and unconstrained choice. 83 In addition, whether confined or not
confined, individuals can be subjected to significant pressures to confess
without necessarily vitiating the voluntariness of the confession.84
The contention that the pressures of confinement annihilate free will also
is belied by the frequency with which courts accept guilty pleas from
incarcerated individuals. One of the prerequisites to the entry of a valid
guilty plea is that it be voluntary. 85 Yet the Supreme Court never has hinted
that incarceration produces actual or threatened physical harm or mental
coercion overbearing the will of the defendant, rendering a guilty plea
involuntary. 86 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that even a guilty plea
entered to avoid the death penalty can be voluntary. 87 Thus, incarceration
does not negate the free will of individuals to make decisions that preserve
their lives, limit the length of prison sentences, or enable them to avoid
further incarceration entirely if a guilty plea leads to the imposition of a
community-based sanction. It would seem discordant, then, to conclude that
incarceration per se makes it much more likely or even somewhat likely that
a decision to be confined in a particular part of a prison a faith-based unit
is coerced and invalid as an involuntary act. 88
The Supreme Court s decision in McKune v. Lile confirms that a
prisoner s choice to live in a particular prison or unit of a prison can be
uncoerced from a constitutional standpoint. 89 That case concerned the
constitutionality of requiring a prisoner, a convicted sex offender, to make
some potentially inculpatory admissions and disclosures as a precondition to
being admitted into a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program ( SATP ).
Specifically, the prisoner had to admit that he had committed the sex crime
of which he had been convicted. 90 In addition, the prisoner had to recount

(E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d on other grounds, 343 F.3d 553, 564 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that confession of
prisoner interrogated by two police officers was voluntary).
83. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 303 (1991) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
84. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969) (finding defendant s confession
voluntary even though police officer falsely told defendant that the person with whom he had committed
the murder already had confessed).
85. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970).
86. See id. at 750 (describing the coercion necessary to render a guilty plea involuntary).
87. Id. at 755.
88. See id. at 750.
89. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
90. Id. at 30.
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his sexual history, including sex crimes with which he had not been
charged. 91
The plaintiff in McKune, a convicted sex offender, contended that these
admission requirements compelled prisoners like him to incriminate
themselves, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 92 An admission that a
prisoner had committed the crime for which he was serving time in prison,
for example, could lead to a prosecution for perjury if he had denied
committing the crime at trial. 93 And the revelation that the prisoner had
committed sex crimes with which he had never been charged might lead to
the filing of criminal charges for those crimes. 94
The Supreme Court rebuffed this Fifth Amendment claim even though
prison officials were exerting considerable pressure on the plaintiff to
comply with the SATP s entry requirements. The officials had told the
plaintiff that if he failed to fill out the Admission of Responsibility and
sexual-history forms, they would transfer him from a medium-security unit to
a maximum-security unit. 95 There he would be confined in a cell with three
other people rather than one, would be unable to leave his cell as much as he
could in the medium-security unit, and would be living in what the Court
recognized was a potentially more dangerous environment. 96 In addition,
he would suffer a considerable diminution of privileges, including curtailed
job opportunities and visitation rights, reduced pay for prison work, and
restrictions on what he could buy in the prison commissary and keep in his
cell. 97
It would be odd, in my opinion, to conclude that exerting such great
pressures on a prisoner to make inculpatory admissions does not constitute
compulsion but that a prisoner s decision to live in a faith-based unit
invariably must be considered unconstitutionally coerced. And such an
unfounded conclusion would be particularly paradoxical since the differences
between conditions in a medium- and maximum-security unit, as in McKune,
typically will be much greater than the differences between the conditions in
a faith-based unit and a prison s general-population unit. 98

91. Id.
92. Id. at 29.
93. Id. at 55 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 30 31 (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 31.
97. Id.
98. Compare id. (listing the differences in confinement conditions between maximum- and mediumsecurity units), with infra Part IV.B (describing the differences in conditions between faith-based units and
other prison units).
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B. Logic
I stated earlier that the contention that prisoners cannot make a true
private choice whether to live in a faith-based unit is also illogical. Here is
why.
Government-paid chaplains are commonplace in prisons (as well as in
the military), but employing them to compensate for the burdens
incarceration (or military service) imposes on the exercise of religion clearly
is constitutional. 99 If a chaplain teaches a Bible-study class to prisoners, the
Establishment Clause is not impinged, because it is constitutional to alleviate
these burdens and because, as the Supreme Court has observed, the link
between government funds and religious training is broken by the
independent and private choice of recipients. 100 Likewise, the independent
and private choice of prisoners obviates any Establishment Clause problems
when a chaplain prays with them, administers sacraments to them, or
provides them with counseling services with a religious perspective.
In addition to chaplains, prisons commonly have chapels as well as other
places whose primary purpose is to enable inmates to worship and engage in
other religious practices. 101 Some prisons, for example, have erected sweat
lodges to accommodate the religious practices of Native American
inmates. 102 None of these places of meditation and worship, which often are
built and operated with government funds, abridge the Establishment Clause,
in part because only prisoners exercising their independent and private
choice frequent them.
If the pressures that attend incarceration do not disable prisoners from
freely and voluntarily deciding to avail themselves of the religious services
provided by prison chaplains or to spend some time in a religious setting, it is
difficult to comprehend how freedom of choice is not tenable when
prisoners are deciding whether to apply for admission into a faith-based
unit. 103 To aver that prisoners are incapacitated from making a true private

99. E.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 1985) (military chaplains); Theriault v.
Silber, 547 F.2d 1279, 1280 (5th Cir. 1977) (prison chaplains); cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
724 25 (2005) (observing that under the Sixth Circuit s approach to religious accommodations, an
approach with which the Supreme Court disagreed, even the employment of prison chaplains would be
unconstitutional).
100. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004).
101. Survey Summary: Faith-Based Programming, supra note 73, at 10 13 tbl.1.
102. See Susan Montoya Bryan, Sweating Out the Demons in Prison: Native Americans Allowed to
Participate in Religious Rites, WASH. POST, June 17, 2007, at A7; Jana Hollingsworth, Imprisoned
Religion, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Jan. 12, 2008, 2008 WLNR 682679.
103. But see Semyonova, supra note 80, at 220 (criticizing courts for failing to consider whether free
choice is truly tenable in prisons).
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choice whether to reside in such a unit betrays, in my opinion, what Justice
Scalia has lamented as a trendy disdain for deep religious conviction : 104 as
long as a prisoner opts for what, for him, may be religion lite, there is no
Establishment Clause problem. But if he seeks to deepen his faith by living
in a faith-based unit, unconstitutional coercion appears.
Opponents of faith-based prison units still might claim that they are
distinguishable from other religious programs and services, like prison
chaplains. The crux of their argument likely would be that the benefits of
living in faith-based units, unlike the benefits of other faith-based programs,
are so great that the pressures to live in them are overwhelming and
irresistible.
The fact that many prisoners eligible to live in faith-based units choose
not to belies this contention, 105 as does the reality that many inmates who
live in the units decide to withdraw from these faith-based residential
programs. 106 But in addition to these indicators of the fallacy that prisoners
inexorably are compelled to live in faith-based prison units, McKune, as
mentioned earlier, stands as a powerful rebuttal to the argument that the
differences in the living conditions in a faith-based unit unconstitutionally
skew prisoners decisions to live in such a unit. 107
C. School Prayers and Faith-Based Prison Units: A False Analogy
Some opponents of faith-based prison units claim that a line of Supreme
Court cases condemning, on Establishment Clause grounds, certain collective
prayers at schools and school events points to the unconstitutionality of faithbased prison units. 108 The analogy is a false one.
Lee v. Weisman 109 is the case these opponents most frequently cite. In
that case, the Supreme Court held that the recitation of nonsectarian prayers
by a rabbi at a high school graduation contravened the Establishment
Clause. 110 The Court evinced a concern about the impressionability of youth
104. Locke, 540 U.S. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY COUNCIL, INITIAL PROCESS AND OUTCOME EVALUATION
OF THE INNERCHANGE FREEDOM INITIATIVE: THE FAITH-BASED PRISON PROGRAM IN TDCJ 9 tbl. (2003)
(reporting that of 866 eligible inmates interviewed to live in a faith-based unit, 624 volunteered to do so).
106. A survey of prisoners who participated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons residential faith-based
program found that six percent of them began the program but later withdrew from it voluntarily. Scott D.
Camp et al., An Exploration into Participation in a Faith-Based Program, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL Y
529, 541 tbl.1 (2006).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 89 98.
108. E.g., Semyonova, supra note 80, at 229.
109. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
110. Id. at 599.
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who, because of their age, might interpret the prayer as an attempt to
employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy. 111 The
Court concluded that by including these prayers in the graduation ceremony,
school officials were coercing students unconstitutionally to express their
assent to these prayers by standing or at least remaining quiet during their
recitation. 112 And since graduation from high school is such a highlight of
people s lives, the Court was not persuaded that teenage graduates who were
nonbelievers had a real choice to avoid participating in a religious practice
that was antithetical to their own views by not attending graduation. 113
For a number of reasons, faith-based prison units are unlike prayers
publicly uttered at high school graduation ceremonies. Three are most
significant.
First, the reason why the Supreme Court has been particularly vigilant
in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and
secondary schools 114 does not apply to prisoners. They are not children.
They are adults, or they are considered mature enough to be punished as
adults. That does not mean that prison officials have the prerogative to pipe
prayers, sectarian or otherwise, through a public-address system to prisoners,
the quintessential captive audience. But it does mean that the Supreme
Court s asserted rationale for its heightened vigilance in the Establishment
Clause school cases is inapplicable.
Second, residence in a faith-based unit is unlike attendance at a high
school graduation. A graduation is the capstone of four years of (one hopes)
hard work and is celebrated as a milestone a send-off of sorts for youth as
they leave their parents nests. Many people may not agree with the
Supreme Court s conclusion in Lee that graduation prayers force students to
engage in a religious practice. But the Supreme Court s additional
observation that students effectively are compelled to attend graduation
ceremonies seems understandable, even though still debatable, due to the
burdens that would ensue if the students stayed home the loss of enjoying
one of life s major milestones with family members and friends.
Living in a faith-based unit, by contrast, has none of the marks of such a
milestone. It is difficult then to comprehend how a prisoner s application for
a transfer to such a unit, analogous in some, though not all, ways to an
application for a transfer to a prison closer to his home, is presumptively
coerced, no matter what the facts. While graduation may be, as the Supreme
111. Id. at 592.
112. Id. at 593.
113. Id. at 595.
114. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005) (plurality opinion) (quoting Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 84 (1987)).
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Court observed in Lee, an event of singular importance to every student, 115
it cannot be said that living in a faith-based unit is of singular importance
to every prisoner. Some prisoners will want to live in such a unit, and others
will not.
A third factor distinguishes the prayers spoken at high school graduations
and residence in a faith-based prison unit: the government does not subject
students to the exceptional burdens on the exercise of their religion to
which prisoners are subject. 116 Thus, faith-based prison units and graduation
prayers are not analogs, because some prisoners may want and need to
overcome these unique burdens, to the extent possible, by living in faithbased units. Some of these prisoners may decide that they need to live with
other prisoners who are seekers or believers in order to effectively
commence what is often described as a spiritual journey. Others may
conclude that they need to live in an environment with an intense spiritual
focus in order to deepen an already existing relationship with God. Still
others may believe that the only or best way that they can come to terms with
their criminal pasts or realize their future potential is to examine and discuss
with others, throughout each day and from a religious perspective, their
errant pasts, their current thoughts and actions, and their hopes for the future.
In sum, saying that the Supreme Court s conclusion that high school
students have no real alternative to avoid graduation prayers 117 means that
prisoners have no real alternative to avoid faith-based units is an
unfounded syllogism. In addition, the cases discussing students rights under
the Establishment Clause are inapposite in the prison context, because as
mentioned before in this Article, government officials can, and sometimes
must, take steps to accommodate prisoners religious practices that they
would be barred from taking elsewhere, including in schools.
IV. FAITH-BASED PRISON UNITS AND GOVERNMENTAL NEUTRALITY
Faith-based prison units raise another question to which this Article will
now turn: whether they reflect governmental favoritism towards religion
barred by the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause obviously
prohibits the government from preferring one religious sect over another,
decreeing, for example, that everyone should adhere to the tenets of Judaism,
Islam, or Christianity. But Justices on the Supreme Court as well as First
Amendment scholars have sparred about the extent to which the

115. Lee, 505 U.S. at 598.
116. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
117. Lee, 505 U.S. at 598.
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Establishment Clause also prohibits government officials from taking actions
that favor, or appear to favor, religion over irreligion. One commonly
espoused view is that such a prohibition is embedded in the Establishment
Clause. 118 But Justice Scalia and others have castigated this view, arguing
that it flouts the Establishment Clause by elevating a bland secularity over
religiosity. 119
The crux of this debate is whether broadly defined governmental
neutrality on religious matters is even possible. 120 This Article refrains
from entering into this imbroglio, nor need it to ascertain that faith-based
prison units can be planned and implemented in a way that meets the
neutrality requirement, whether broadly or narrowly defined.
A. The Establishment of Faith-Based Prison Units
The Establishment Clause is not the only First Amendment provision that
requires the government to be neutral on certain matters. A contentneutrality requirement, for example, is subsumed within the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech. 121 This requirement places
constraints on the government s restriction of speech based on its content.
The Supreme Court has held that withholding certain publications from
prisoners can be neutral in the constitutional sense even though censorship
decisions are based to some extent, on content. 122 According to the Court,
prison officials still act with the requisite neutrality when censoring
communications with prisoners as long as their actions further an important
or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression. 123
118. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (reiterating that the
First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality . . . between religion and nonreligion (quoting
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))); Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 361 62 (arguing that a
core purpose of the Establishment Clause is to ensure that people who are irreligious, in addition to the
adherents of all religions, feel included in society).
119. E.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 885 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In McCreary County,
Justice Scalia debunked what he termed the demonstrably false principle that government cannot favor
religion over irreligion. Id. at 893; see also Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose If You Choose Not to
Play: Toward a More Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 5 6 (2006)
(noting that courts efforts to avoid offending the irreligious are not religiously neutral, appearing
instead to be a judicial mandate of public secularism ).
120. See Esenberg, supra note 119, at 6 7 (arguing that [c]omplete neutrality between religion and
irreligion is unobtainable because a jurisprudence that defines government neutrality on religion as acting
as if it did not exist will cause its religious citizens to feel excluded ).
121. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007) (affirming that a governmental
restriction on speech based on its content is presumptively invalid ).
122. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415 (1989).
123. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
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Similarly, because faith-based prison units further significant
governmental interests unrelated to a partisan support for religion, their use
does not necessarily, or even usually, reflect the lack of neutrality on
religious matters that raises Establishment Clause concerns. Some of these
more significant interests are highlighted below.
1. Reducing Recidivism
One of the substantial governmental interests to which faith-based prison
units are rationally linked is the interest in curbing recidivism. This interest
is of primal importance because the recidivism rates of released prisoners are
currently so high. Within three years after their release from prison,
approximately two-thirds of ex-prisoners are rearrested, usually for a felony
or serious misdemeanor. 124 During this same time period, more than half of
the former prisoners end up back in prison, whether for new crimes or for
violations of their release conditions. 125
A number of studies have examined the impact religiousness has on
crime and delinquency. Different data-collection methods can be used to
measure a person s religiousness, such as monitoring the frequency with
which people attend group worship services. 126 But whatever method
employed, most studies have found a negative correlation between
religiousness and criminal or delinquent actions.127 In other words, it
appears that religiousness inhibits the inclination or propensity of many
people to commit crimes or delinquent acts. 128
Some studies on faith-based prison units have concluded that they show
promise in their potential to reduce recidivism. 129 But the specific effects
124. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 193427, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1, 3 4 tbls.2 & 3 (2002).
125. Id. at 1.
126. Colin J. Baier & Bradley R.E. Wright, “If You Love Me, Keep My Commandments”: A MetaAnalysis of the Effect of Religion on Crime, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 13 (2001). Another common
way to measure religiousness is to ask people about their religious beliefs and the extent to which they
perceive themselves as religious. Id.
127. See BYRON R. JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. FOR RES. ON RELIGION & URB. CIV. SOC Y, OBJECTIVE
HOPE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
7, 12 13 (2002), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/crrucs _objective_hope.pdf; Baier &
Wright, supra note 126, at 16.
128. Studies on drug and alcohol abuse, often a prelude to criminal activity, have yielded similar
results. For example, the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse has reported that individuals
who do not attend religious services are much more likely to binge drink and to use illicit drugs. THE
NAT L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, SO HELP ME GOD: SUBSTANCE ABUSE, RELIGION AND
SPIRITUALITY 2, 7 9 (2001).
129. E.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 23 24 (reporting that offenders
who graduated from Prison Fellowship Ministries InnerChange Freedom Initiative ( IFI ) recidivated
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that faith-based prison units have on recidivism rates are, at this point, less
than clear. These faith-based programs still are in their infancy, so the data
that have been collected about them are preliminary in nature. In addition,
concerns have been raised that the reported data have been skewed to show
that the units are effective in reducing recidivism. 130
For several reasons, however, the lack of definitive proof that faith-based
prison units reduce recidivism does not undercut the validity of the point that
prison officials can act with the requisite neutrality in establishing faithbased prison units. In other words, the officials preeminent motive in
establishing these units still can be the strictly secular ones of reducing
recidivism and finding more effective ways to do so.
First, conclusive evidence of the efficacy of an innovative prison
program never exists at its beginning. Therefore, demanding that prison
officials produce such evidence before or even soon after initiating a new
program is to require the impossible, dooming prison officials efforts to
potentially reduce recidivism through a cutting-edge faith-based program.
Second, even if there were a consensus that the data collected thus far on
faith-based prison units do not show that they have had the hoped-for impact
on recidivism, that does not mean that these disappointing results would be
replicated in the future. It must be remembered that prison officials and the
persons or entities with which they may contract to operate these units are
still on the learning curve in designing these units operations to maximize
their effectiveness. So even if it were concluded that the first generation of
faith-based prison units has not precipitated a decline in the commission of
crimes by released prisoners, it is possible that these units may be
reconfigured, based on what is learned about them, so that the next
generation of faith-based units achieves or better achieves the goal of
reducing recidivism.
There is a third reason why the lack of unequivocal proof that faith-based
prison units curb recidivism does not foreclose the interest in recidivism
reduction from serving as an indicator of the government s neutrality in
establishing these units. The mass of studies showing an inverse relationship
between religiousness and crime already provides the empirical foundation,
at a significantly lower rate than comparison groups of inmates, including those who had volunteered for,
but did not participate in, IFI and those who met IFI s selection criteria but did not participate in the
program).
130. E.g., Mark A.R. Kleiman, Faith-Based Fudging: How a Bush-Promoted Christian Program
Fakes Success by Massaging Data, SLATE, Aug. 5, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/ 2086617 (criticizing
the statistics purportedly showing IFI s success in reducing recidivism as misleading, since to be
considered a graduate of the program, participants had to have completed successfully both the in-prison
and post-release portions of the program, including the requirement of securing employment upon
release).
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if one were needed, for concluding that in opening these units, prison
officials are striving to advance the substantial, and indeed compelling,
interest in averting future crimes. 131 During the formative years in which
these units are being created and calibrated, the results of these studies
should be considered quantitative evidence of a neutral, nonsectarian reason
for instituting these faith-based programs.
2. Protecting Institutional Security
Another interest of overriding importance that prison officials can cite
when instituting faith-based prison units is the interest in protecting
institutional security. Prison officials are entrusted with the responsibilities
of keeping inmates and staff safe and maintaining order and discipline in
places where convicted felons, many of whom have committed murder, rape,
robbery, and other violent crimes, reside. In meeting the daunting challenges
that attend these responsibilities, prison officials could rationally conclude
that faith-based prison units may be effective tools to protect institutional
security. Much, though not all, of the inmate misconduct that can jeopardize
institutional security is criminal in nature. When prisoners kill, rape, assault,
or steal from other inmates or correctional staff, intentionally damage others
property, or use illegal drugs, they are committing crimes, as well as
disciplinary infractions. Consequently, the panoply of studies finding that
religion is a persistent . . . inhibitor of adult crime 132 provides empirical
support for the augmentation of faith-based programming opportunities for
prisoners for the purely secular reason of attempting to make prisons safer
and more secure.
Although there has been little research focusing specifically on the
impact of religion on prisoners violation of prison rules, one of the more
comprehensive analyses of this subject reported a statistically significant
inverse relationship between confinement for disciplinary infractions and
prisoners religiousness. 133 Another study found that religiosity directly
reduces the likelihood of arguments between prisoners and indirectly
diminishes the likelihood that they will engage in physical fights.134

131. See supra notes 127 28 and accompanying text.
132. E.g., Byron R. Johnson et al., Religious Programs, Institutional Adjustment, and Recidivism
Among Former Inmates in Prison Fellowship Programs, 14 JUST. Q. 145, 163 (1997).
133. Todd R. Clear & Melvina T. Sumter, Prisoners, Prison, and Religion: Religion and Adjustment
to Prison, in RELIGION, THE COMMUNITY, AND THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 127,
143 44 (Thomas P. O Connor & Nathaniel J. Pallone eds., 2002).
134. Kent R. Kerley et al., Religiosity, Religious Participation, and Negative Prison Behaviors, 44 J.
FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 443, 450, 453 (2005).
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Research studies like these may provide independent empirical support for
the nonsectarian goal of enhancing institutional security by affording inmates
additional opportunities to develop spiritually, whether in faith-based units or
through other faith-based programming.
3. Accommodating Prisoners’ Exercise of Their Religion
Even if studies were to determine definitively some day, after enough
time has elapsed for the operations of faith-based prison units to be calibrated
and refined based on research and experience, that faith-based prison units
are ineffective in reducing recidivism or protecting institutional security,
those research findings would not mean that, by continuing to operate these
units, government officials are acting without the neutrality the
Establishment Clause commands. That is because government officials can
take steps to accommodate prisoners religious needs and interests that they
would be barred from taking in the outside world. In other words, faithbased prison units can be a legitimate means of meeting a third significant
governmental interest that of relieving or diminishing burdens the
government itself has imposed on inmates ability to develop spiritually
while they are incarcerated.
Justice O Connor has said, It is disingenuous to look for a purely
secular purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the
free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden. 135 In my
opinion, it is not disingenuous to undertake this kind of inquiry when prison
officials open faith-based units in an effort to reduce recidivism, enhance
institutional security, or realize other secular ends. But if, on the other hand,
the units are opened to compensate for government-created obstacles to
spiritual development and growth, prison officials do not need to scurry
around and try to find secular goals to which they can point as rationales for
this particular kind of faith-based program. In fact, such feigning regarding
the purpose for which a faith-based unit is added to the mix of programming
options at a prison demeans the legitimacy and importance of the
governmental interest in palliating the harm ensuing from the exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise in prisons, the
same interest that underlay the Supreme Court s holding in Cutter that
RLUIPA is not facially unconstitutional. 136

135. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
136. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
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B. Conditions in Faith-Based Prison Units
Although including a faith-based unit in a prison, in and of itself, does
not evidence the lack of neutrality that contravenes the Establishment Clause,
it is possible that conditions in the unit, compared to conditions in the
prison s general population, or some other unit used as a benchmark for
comparison, might show that the government is favoring religion in a way
that the Establishment Clause forbids. To give an extreme example to
illustrate this point, if prisoners in a faith-based unit were served sumptuous
meals of steak, lobster, and wine, slept in posh rooms with large brass beds,
and could take private bubble baths each night, while prisoners in the general
population were fed the standard and often unpalatable prison fare, slept in
spartanly furnished rooms, and bathed in large shower rooms with a dozen
other inmates, the differences in the prisoners conditions of confinement
would be tantamount to an unofficial decree that prisoners should become
more religious or join a particular religious sect.
Some individuals who are highly critical of faith-based prison units have
argued or intimated that inmates would have to be afforded an equally
attractive alternative to confinement in a faith-based unit in order for it to be
constitutional. 137 For several reasons, I disagree.
1. “Equal” Living Conditions—An Unworkable Standard
First, requiring equality in conditions as the litmus test for neutrality
would be to require the impossible. For an array of legitimate and often
unavoidable reasons, conditions in a faith-based unit might not mirror those
in the general-population unit or some other unit with which the faith-based
unit is being compared. For example, the design and construction of a
prison s units may foreclose such identical conditions. Housing units
frequently vary in the size of their cells or dormitory rooms, the amount of
dayroom space, access to natural light, the location and number of toilets,
sinks, and showers, age, and other significant and insignificant ways. If
faith-based units physical appearance must mimic that of other units, they
rarely will get out of the programming gates at many prisons.
Even if there are no differences in the units physical configuration, the
units may house a different number of inmates, which in turn may have an
impact on their day-to-day lives. For example, a faith-based unit may house
fewer prisoners than its general-population counterpart when inmates still are
becoming aware of this faith-based program or demand for the program has
137. Semyonova, supra note 80, at 232.
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shifted downwards, even though perhaps temporarily, due to natural
fluctuations in the prison population. And it bears noting that to require an
absolute equivalence in the number of prisoners in both units might spawn,
ironically, overly aggressive efforts to recruit prisoners to live in the faithbased unit, efforts that could generate Establishment Clause concerns.
A faith-based unit and the unit with which it is being compared also may,
and likely will, differ in the number of volunteers providing services to
prisoners. Prisons typically are unable to attract enough volunteers to visit or
mentor all of the inmates confined in the prison or to help them in other
ways. People often are afraid of prisoners and, in any event, are skeptical
that their service work will bear much fruit with persons whom they perceive
as incorrigible. Individuals who are religious, however, may be more
inclined to avail themselves of service opportunities in a faith-based unit,
believing that their time with inmates who have manifested an interest in
deep and sustained spiritual development likely will have a more positive,
profound, and permanent effect on them. In addition, prospective volunteers
may feel safer with such inmates.
There are myriad other ways in which a faith-based unit and a
comparative unit may not be, for quite legitimate reasons, equally
attractive in their conditions and operations. Which brings me to the second
reason why I disagree with those who espouse a constitutional need for such
equivalence: such identity between units is not only impossible, it is
unnecessary.
2. “Equal” Living Conditions—A Rejected Standard
In Cutter, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that each step the
government takes to compensate for the burdens that incarceration imposes
on the exercise of religion must be matched by some parallel step to allay
restrictions on secular interests. 138 Religious accommodations, the Court
observed, need not come packaged with benefits to secular entities. 139
Thus, it is not inherently unconstitutional for Congress, through RLUIPA, to
have required that a compelling interest test be met to justify incursions on
prisoners religious practices, while restraints on most other constitutional
rights asserted by prisoners only need pass Turner s lax reasonable
relationship test. Similarly, just because government officials open a faithbased prison unit does not mean that they must creatively engineer some out-

138. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 724 25.
139. Id. at 724 (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)).
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of-the-ordinary secular unit or programming in order to avoid abridging the
Establishment Clause.
Cutter itself confirms, though, that even though a faith-based unit may
not inexorably or even usually abridge the Establishment Clause, it may be
structured or operated in a way that transgresses that constitutional line.
While the Supreme Court held in that case that RLUIPA is not
unconstitutional on its face, the Court cautioned that it might be applied in a
way that violates the Establishment Clause. 140 In assessing the merit of a
claim that a particular religious accommodation afforded under RLUIPA is
unconstitutional, the Court noted that the effect that the accommodation has
on other prisoners and on the maintenance of order and security within the
prison must be considered. 141 If the religious accommodation inflicts
unjustified burdens on other inmates or compromises institutional security,
a court appropriately may find that RLUIPA, as it is being applied in the case
before it, violates the Establishment Clause. 142
Similarly, if a faith-based unit imposes unwarranted burdens on prisoners
not living in that unit or jeopardizes institutional security, the unit may
violate the Establishment Clause s strictures. Those who evince what is
often open hostility towards religion may be quick to argue that a faith-based
prison unit unduly burdens other prisoners because it consumes resources
that could be used to provide them with more or better programming or other
benefits. But courts should be wary of arguments that interlace absence of a
benefit with the imposition of a burden.
Whenever government funds are expended to accommodate prisoners
religious needs or interests, whether for chaplains, chapels, or other
nonresidential religious services or programs, that money could be used
elsewhere, often to the benefit of other prisoners. 143 The transposition by
opponents of faith-based units of a benefit that has not accrued into a burden
would mean that many, if not most, governmental actions taken to
accommodate prisoners religious practices, needs, and interests are
unconstitutional, a result palpably at odds with the language and tenor of the
Supreme Court s decision in Cutter.
It also bears noting that specialized housing units, which consume
resources that could be used for prisoners outside those units, are not at all
uncommon in prisons. Therapeutic units for inmates who need intensive and
140. Id. at 725 26.
141. Id. at 720 23.
142. Id. at 726.
143. For a capsulization of the amount of money budgeted for faith-based programming in each
state s prisons in 2003, see Survey Summary: Faith-Based Programming, supra note 73, at 14 15 tbl.2. In
some states, several million dollars were reserved for this kind of programming. Id.
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holistic substance-abuse treatment, sex-offender units, mental-health units,
youthful-offender units, and other special units are common features of many
prisons. 144 Yet few would describe these units, which are designed to meet
the special needs of certain categories of prisoners, as burdens on other
prisoners. Nor should faith-based units be perceived as burdensome to others
simply because they are designed to meet what for some prisoners is another
kind of unmet special need a spiritual need.
Finally, those who would hasten to describe every difference in the
conditions or treatment of prisoners living in faith-based units as the
infliction of a burden on other prisoners that gives rise to Establishment
Clause concerns would be mindful to heed the Supreme Court s cautionary
note in Cutter. The Court in that case correctly recognized that the so-called
benefits of a religious accommodation actually may result in the
imposition of burdens on the person receiving the accommodation, burdens
to which other prisoners are not subject. 145 The Court cited the kosher diet
consisting of a fruit, vegetable, granola bar, and liquid nutritional supplement
fed an inmate at every single meal, day in and day out, as an example of a
benefit that might equally be considered a burden. 146
The murky and often indecipherable line between burdens and benefits
also may be apparent when examining conditions in faith-based units, where
inmates typically have much less freedom than other prisoners. These
inmates may be required to get up at dawn, denied the amount of free time
that other prisoners enjoy to play cards, socialize, or otherwise do what they
want, and be subjected to other variant conditions that some or many
prisoners would perceive as burdens, not benefits. 147 Thus, the answer to the
question whether prisoners incarcerated in faith-based units are reaping
benefits not shared by other prisoners or are enduring burdens from which
other prisoners are exempt often will depend, largely or sometimes
completely, on the eye of the beholder.
For this reason and others
discussed above, courts should be alert for, and prepared to rebuff, reflexive
and pedantic arguments that differences in the treatment of prisoners in a

144. See HARRY E. ALLEN & CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 485 (7th ed. 1995);
FRANK SCHMALLEGER & JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 260 61, 435, 442
(2d ed. 2005); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24
CRIME & JUST. 189, 220 (1998); Jon Nordheimer, New Look at Jail Unit Housing Sex Offenders, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at B6.
145. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 721 n.10.
146. Id.
147. For a description of the highly structured regimen in one faith-based unit, see Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 901 03 (S.D. Iowa
2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007).
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faith-based unit are tantamount to the disadvantageous treatment of other
prisoners that reflects governmental favoritism towards religion.
C. Neutrality Among Religious Sects
While many of the arguments that faith-based units evince
unconstitutional governmental favoritism towards religion founder upon
close examination, there still are some shoals through which prison officials
must navigate in order for the units to meet any neutrality requirement
subsumed within the Establishment Clause. As mentioned earlier, the
meaning of that requirement has sparked great debate, particularly on the
question whether strict neutrality between religion and irreligion is even
possible. 148 But whatever the outcome of that debate, one thing is clear: the
Establishment Clause generally precludes the government from singling out a
particular religion for preferential or disadvantageous treatment.
In Cutter, the Supreme Court underscored that one of the factors
underlying its conclusion was that RLUIPA was administered neutrally
among religious sects. 149 But acting neutrally with respect to religious sects
does not mean that there must be, or could be, absolute equivalence in
governmental actions impacting them. If prison officials, for example, hire a
prison chaplain who happens to be a Protestant minister, that does not mean
that they also must hire a prison chaplain who is an imam, one who is a
rabbi, another who is a Catholic priest, and an assortment of other chaplains
to match the denominational preferences and identities of the inmate
population.
Ironically, if the government were to strive to achieve a kind of
egalitarian ideal its efforts not only would inevitably fail, they in fact would
create different kinds of disparities between inmates of different religious
faiths. For example, if there were only a handful of Jewish inmates in the
prison, the chaplain who is a rabbi could provide them with a greater array of
religious services than could a chaplain of a different faith ministering to
several hundred inmates. One judge noted the similar dilemmatic choices
confronting prison officials trying to afford equal programming options to
female inmates, who comprise a smaller percentage of the prison population
than men, observing that [e]quality of one variable forces inequality of the
other. Equality is an arithmetic impossibility. 150

148. See supra notes 118 20 and accompanying text.
149. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720, 723 24.
150. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1235 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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Observations that the Supreme Court made in Cruz v. Beto buttress the
conclusion that the First Amendment does not command that religious
accommodations be identical for all religious sects. 151 The prisoner who
brought suit in Cruz was a Buddhist who claimed that prison officials were
providing Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant inmates with an array of
opportunities to practice their religion with which he was not being afforded,
some of which were being subsidized by the government. 152 While the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must be afforded a reasonable
opportunity that was comparable to that afforded other prisoners to
practice his religion, 153 the Court added the following, and important,
addendum:
We do not suggest, of course, that every religious sect or group within a
prison however few in number must have identical facilities or
personnel. A special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for
every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be
provided without regard to the extent of the demand. But reasonable
opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious
freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear
of penalty. 154

According to this passage in Cruz, it appears that a touchstone for
deciding if apparent differences in the religious accommodations provided to
religious sects in a prison impinge on the First Amendment is whether a
prisoner not receiving a particular religious accommodation, such as the
services of a state-paid chaplain from the same religious sect as his, has
reasonable opportunities to practice his religion. And prison officials also
must not punish the prisoner or cause him to fear being punished for availing
or not availing himself of these opportunities.
Cruz admittedly was a case assessing the scope of protection afforded by
the First Amendment s Free Exercise Clause, not the Establishment
Clause. 155 But it is difficult to envision that the outcome of the case would
have been different had the prisoner brought his claim under the
Establishment Clause that the Court would have concluded that the
Establishment Clause requires identical facilities, personnel, and other

151. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
152. Id. at 319 20.
153. Id. at 322.
154. Id. at 322 n.2.
155. The plaintiff in Cruz also averred that he was being denied the equal protection of the law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 320 n.1.
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accommodations for each and every religious sect, regardless of the extent of
the demand for a particular accommodation or other circumstances.
The way in which the Court ultimately couches the test for ensuring that
there is the requisite neutrality between religious sects when accommodating
prisoners religious needs and interests may not necessarily track the
language in Cruz. But however the test is worded, it would seem that it
would need to encompass the idea that seems to pervade the Court s opinion
in that case that the government acts without the requisite neutrality
when it creates a substantial risk of suppressing religious differences. 156
CONCLUSION
This Article refutes three of the misperceptions that undergird
conclusions that faith-based prison units are inherently and inevitably
unconstitutional: first, that the Establishment Clause applies the same way in
prisons as it does outside prisons; second, that prisons are so coercive in
nature that prisoners are incapable of making a true private choice to live
in a faith-based unit; and third, that the government betrays an
unconstitutional lack of neutrality on religious matters when it establishes or
subsidizes a faith-based prison unit.
That does not mean, of course, that all faith-based units necessarily are
constitutional. Just as RLUIPA can be applied in a way that violates the
Establishment Clause, so can faith-based units be operated in a way that
contravenes that constitutional provision. But it is important to at least
attempt to ensure that broad-brush and at times reflexive arguments asserted
against them do not discourage these innovative efforts to augment and
modulate religious programming to better meet the varied religious needs
and interests of prisoners and further important penological objectives. As
prison officials strive to realize these goals in conformance with the
Constitution, it would behoove them and others to remember that the devil
is in the details.

156. See Esenberg, supra note 119, at 64 65.

